Abstract. Suppose many messages are encrypted using a public-key encryption scheme. Imagine an adversary that may adaptively ask for openings of some of the ciphertexts. Selective opening (SO) security requires that the unopened ciphertexts remain secure, in the sense that this adversary cannot derive any nontrivial information about the messages in the unopened ciphertexts.
Introduction
Motivation. It is a challenging task to find a useful and achievable definition of security for encryption schemes. There seems to be no "one size fits all" security notion; for instance, certain settings involve key-dependent messages c i ← Enc(pk , m i ) for messages m i sampled from a (joint) adversarially selected message distribution D. A can then select a subset I of all c i to be opened. In addition to the openings of all m i (for i ∈ I), A also receives a full message vector m which either consists of all actually encrypted messages m i , or of messages m i freshly sampled from D, conditioned on m i = m i for all i ∈ I. As usual, A has to decide which case it is. Thus, A has to distinguish between the encrypted messages and messages that are "just as plausible" given only the opened messages. To obtain our separating scheme, we take an IND-CCA secure scheme and modify its decryption algorithm. Namely, we now allow a special type of decryption queries (soa, Z) in which Z contains a whole ciphertext vector c, along with openings of a subset of these ciphertexts. (For now, it is easiest to imagine that this subset is selected externally and randomly.) If the openings are valid, then decryption will return an error-corrected version of the message vector from c. (Hence, the scheme itself actually helps an adversary that can prove that it is taking part in an SO attack.)
This immediately gives rise to a weak IND-SO-CCA attack: a suitable adversary A essentially only has to relay between its decryption oracle and the SO experiment to obtain the decryption of all challenge ciphertexts. The message distribution considered in the attack will only select codewords, so that the mentioned error correction will not disturb the decryption. Moreover, the underlying code has the property that a codeword is not fixed by the openings that occur during the attack. (Hence, a re-sampling will lead to a different message vector and can thus be detected.)
It is more challenging to prove that our modification does not harm the scheme's IND-CCA security. Intuitively, an IND-CCA adversary B could try to embed its own (IND-CCA) challenge c * into a ciphertext vector c and obtain the decryption of c * through a suitable (soa, Z) query. (With a little luck, B will not have to open c * , so decryption will return the full message vector, including the decryption of c * .) To cope with such an IND-CCA adversary B, we will answer (soa, Z) only with the error-corrected message vector. Decryption will ensure (by the random choice of I and by ensuring suitably valid openings) that most of the encrypted messages m i and all opened messages are consistent with a unique single codeword. (If this is not the case, then the query is rejected. Of course, we will have to make sure that B also learns nothing from the fact that the query was rejected.) Decryption then returns this unique codeword, and not simply the decryption of all individual ciphertexts. This procedure makes sure that a single ciphertext c * embedded into c alone has no significant influence on the returned value. Our strategy is somewhat reminiscent of the strategy of Bellare et al. [5] , who show a black-box impossibility for IND-SO secure commitments. Our approach can be seen as a refinement and adaptation of their ideas to the PKE setting and to the standard model.
Note that our attack only uses two decryption queries; furthermore, one of these queries can be substituted by a random oracle query when adapting the scheme to the random oracle model. Thus, our scheme also gives rise to a separation between IND and weak IND-SO security in a bounded CCA setting [10] . Moreover, since CCA settings with only 1 decryption query and nonmalleability are tightly related [6] , our counterexample has also implications for non-malleability notions of security. (See Section D for details.) Details on Our Generic Group IND-CPA/IND-SO-CPA Equivalence. Our equivalence result applies to a broad class of encryption schemes over prime order groups for which public keys as well as ciphertexts can be described by (low-degree) polynomials "in the exponent". We model the underlying group as generic (following Shoup's formalization) with respect to the IND-SO-CPA adversary and the adversarial message sampling algorithm. That means that the only basic group operations such algorithms may perform are equality testing, application of the group law, and computation of inverse elements. However, note that this is already sufficient, e.g., for realizing our efficient IND-SO-CCA adversary (see also Section C). A potential hash function utilized by the encryption scheme is modeled as a Random Oracle. Although the model we consider for our equivalence result may appear highly idealized, proving the equivalence is anything but trivial. There are several novel and challenging aspects about this proof; we only highlight a few here.
The common strategy of a proof in the generic group model is to show that, with overwhelming probability, an adversary does not obtain any information about the underlying secrets (e.g., secret keys, the challenge bit in indistinguishability games, etc.) of the considered game (IND-SO-CPA in our case). Thus, it can only win by mere guessing. To this end, one shows by means of a simulation game (where all secrets are replaced by formal variables) that a generic algorithm may only obtain information about secrets from nontrivial equations that hold between low-degree combinations of these secrets. (An equation is called trivial if it holds for all possible choices of the secrets.) If the secret values are chosen uniformly at random then by applying standard techniques (e.g., the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma in the case of prime power order groups) one can see that such equations may occur only very rarely. However, in our setting also the adversarial messages, which are chosen according to an arbitrary (efficiently re-samplable) distribution, belong to the secrets for which we want to argue that they are hidden information-theoretically. Moreover, in the opening phase, parts of the secrets are even disclosed to the adversary. We cope with these issues by modifying the way we usually simulate in the generic model and, hence, how non-trivial equations are defined. In particular, we need to adapt the simulation when the opening phase starts and show that a non-trivial equation and "bad" message distribution can be leveraged to win the IND-CPA game.
In a nutshell, our proof is split into two parts: First, we show that in order to win the IND-CPA game, it suffices that for all possible public keys and encryptions of a message vector, we can efficiently compute a non-trivial representation of the neutral group element in terms of the public key and (at least one of) the corresponding ciphertexts. The idea is to replace one of the messages with a different one for which this equation does not hold anymore and use the two messages in the IND-CPA game. Second, we show that from any generic IND-SO-CPA adversary, such a representation and message vector can be extracted. Outline. After recalling some definitions in Section 2, we describe our separation in Section 3. The generic equivalence in the passive case can be found in Section 4. Sections A, B, and C discuss the restrictions we make for the CPA case, and in particular show that our separating scheme from the CCA case (and its analysis) is generic in our sense. Finally, Section D briefly describes extensions to our CCA separation.
Preliminaries
Notation. For n ∈ AE, let [n] := {1, . . . , n}. Throughout the paper, k ∈ AE denotes the security parameter. For a finite set S, we denote by s ← S the process of sampling s uniformly from S. For a probabilistic algorithm A, we denote with R A the space of A's random coins. y ← A(x; R) denotes the process of running A on input x and with randomness R ← R A , and assigning y the result. We write y ← A(x) for y ← A(x; R) with uniform R. If A's running time is polynomial in k, then A is called probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT). [5] : IND-SO-ENC security universally quantifies over all (efficiently re-samplable) message distributions. We let A choose samp instead, e.g., to allow a message distribution that depends on the public key pk . (In fact, otherwise it is not even clear that the resulting definition implies IND-CPA security.) Besides, unlike Böhl et al. [8] , we model only one round of openings for simplicity. (However, our results hold also for multiple rounds of openings.)
PRFs. A pseudorandom function (PRF) is a function
PRF : K × D → R for finite K, R, such that oracle access to PRF K (·) (for K ← K) is indistinguishable from oracle access to a truly random function RF : D → R. Concretely, for a distinguisher D, let Adv prf PRF,D (k) := Pr D PRF K (·) = 1 − Pr D RF (·) = 1 .
Experiment Exp
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Our Separating Encryption Scheme
In this section, we describe a PKE scheme that is IND-CCA secure, but not weakly IND-SO-CCA secure. So our scheme separates standard security from even the weakest considered form of selective opening security.
The Scheme
Specific Notation and Assumptions. In the following, let = p be the finite field of size p for a prime p. (We will later choose a (k + 1)-bit p as part of the public key of our scheme.) By ipol(
S denote the set of all -sized subsets of S. We will assume a PRF
k cannot be distinguished from access to a truly random function that maps arbitrary bitstrings to uniform k-sized subsets of [3k]). We will also assume an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme PKE = (Gen , Enc , Dec ) with message space . (The requirement about the message space is without loss of generality [19] ; see also Section B for a scheme with a group as message space.) Construction. PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is constructed from PKE : Key generation adds a PRF key to sk :
Encryption marks ciphertexts as "regular": Enc(pk , m) runs c ← Enc (pk , m) and outputs c = (reg, c ). Decryption decrypts "regular" ciphertexts as PKE , but also offers possibilities to evaluate PRF K and perform a special type of attack by decrypting "nonregular" ciphertexts:
Here, the function SOA(sk , Z) operates as follows:
If there are indices i = j with c i = c j , then return ⊥.
If there is an i ∈ I with Enc
for F ; hence, if such an F exists, it can be found efficiently (and in fact is unique). Return F , or ⊥ if no such F exists.
Intuitively, SOA(sk , Z) returns a polynomial F that is consistent with all opened values m i (for i ∈ I), and most unopened values m i (for i ∈ [3k] \ I).
(This slight distinction will be crucial to ensure that access to SOA does not enable IND-CCA attacks.)
Rationale and Intuition for Security Analysis. The rationale of our modifications to PKE is to enable a specific attack that only a weak IND-SO-CCA adversary is able to perform. Concretely, once an adversary supplies 3k ciphertexts along with openings of k of them (in a suitable Dec(sk , (soa, Z)) query), the scheme itself helps to decrypt all ciphertexts. Indeed, PKE is weakly IND-SO-CCA insecure with respect to the message distribution D = (F (i)) i∈[3k] with a uniform degree-≤ k polynomial F : by relaying between the experiment and its Dec oracle, an adversary can obtain all (i.e., even unopened) challenge messages. The difficult part will be to prove that our modification preserves the IND-CCA security of PKE . That is, we will have to prove that (sel, Z) and (soa, Z) decryption queries do not help an IND-CCA adversary A on PKE. For (sel, Z) queries, this is intuitively clear, as they are answered independently of the "actual" secret key sk . For (soa, Z) queries, we will argue that the answer can already be deduced by "regular" decryption queries (reg, c ). Concretely, if the PKE ciphertext c * from A's own challenge (reg, c * ) does not appear as ciphertext in Z, A can itself use Dec queries to emulate SOA(sk , Z). And even if Z contains c * , A can still use Dec to decrypt all ciphertexts in Z except for c * . We will show that SOA(sk , Z) can be reasonably well approximated when knowing all plaintexts encrypted in Z except for at most one. Namely, in order not to be rejected by SOA(sk , Z), almost all of the ciphertexts in Z must already decrypt to a value F (i) that is consistent with one F . Knowing all but one plaintext allows a simulation to compute this F , and thus SOA(sk , Z)'s answer. Variations. Section D gives variations for bounded CCA security and nonmalleability.
Why PKE Is Not Weakly IND-SO-CCA Secure
We now formally show that PKE allows for a simple weak IND-SO-CCA attack.
Theorem 1. The PKE scheme PKE from Section 3.1 is not weakly IND-SO-CCA secure.
Proof. We construct a weak IND-SO-CCA adversary A on PKE. On input pk , A outputs the 3k-message distribution
along with a suitable (re-)sampling algorithm samp. (For instance, samp can randomly extend its input (F (i)) i∈I to k + 1 evaluation points as necessary and then use polynomial interpolation to retrieve F and thus all F (i).) Note that k messages m i = F (i) from a D-sample do not fully determine F and thus the whole message vector.
Once A receives a ciphertext vector c := (reg, c i ) i∈ [3k] , it queries its decryption oracle on (sel, (c i ) i∈ [3k] ) to receive a k-sized subset I ⊂ [3k]. This I is the subset that A submits to its weak IND-SO-CCA experiment. Let bad coll be the event that c i = c j for some i = j. By the correctness of PKE , this can only
k for any fixed i, j. Hence, a union bound over all i, j shows that
We will thus assume ¬bad coll hereafter. Upon receiving openings (m i , R i ) i∈I and a message vector m 
which is non-negligible (and in fact negligibly close to the maximal advantage).
Why PKE Is Still IND-CCA Secure
We show that PKE inherits PKE 's IND-CCA security. Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary on PKE that makes exactly q decryption queries. We proceed in games, and let out i denote the output of Game i. Game 1 is the original IND-CCA game with A. Consequently,
In Game 2, we answer decryption queries of the form (sel, Z) with RF (Z) instead of PRF K (Z) for a truly random function RF : {0,
k . (We will assume that RF is efficiently implemented, e.g., using lazy sampling.) A straightforward reduction to PRF's pseudorandomness yields
In Game 3, we slightly change the way decryption queries of the form (soa, Z) are answered. 
This modified version SOA only yields different values from that of Game 2 if Intuitively, bad impl is unlikely, because it necessitates that the (randomly chosen) subset I = RF ((c i ) i∈ [3k] ) happens to contain only indices i with m i = F (i) for the uniquely determined polynomial F . However, requirement (c) states that k − 1 indices i are not compatible with F , meaning m i = F (i). The probability that any such i is contained in I is overwhelming. We prove the following lemma after the main proof.
Using Lemma 1, we thus get for k ≥ 2:
for a suitable IND-CCA adversary B on PKE . Concretely, observe that the whole Game 3 only uses sk to decrypt PKE ciphertexts different from c * . Hence, B can simulate A, using its own challenge public key pk and ciphertext c * as A's public key and challenge. A's choice of challenge messages m 0 , m 1 is also used by B. A's decryption queries (reg, c ) are relayed (as c ) to B's decryption oracle; (sel, Z) and (soa, Z) queries are answered by B for A, using B's own decryption oracle as necessary for (soa, Z) queries. (Note that B's challenge c * will never have to be decrypted by our change from Game 3.) This adversary B thus perfectly simulates Game 3 for A, so we get (1). 
Taking things together yields
Since A makes only q decryption queries, it can only submit at most q different c. For each c, the probability is at most (5/6) k that an implausible query with this c exists. Hence, a union bound shows that
Equivalence of IND-SO-CPA and IND-CPA in the GGM
We give evidence towards the equivalence of IND-SO-CPA and IND-CPA by showing that for a broad class of encryption schemes any efficient generic IND-SO-CPA adversary can be turned into an efficient IND-CPA adversary.
In the following, some additional notation is needed: For a vector of variables X or polynomials P, let |X| and |P| denote the size of the corresponding vector. For a polynomial P , let |P | denote the number of non-zero monomials.
The Class of (P, E, H, H)-CS-Type Encryption Schemes
The following definition covers a broad class of public-key encryption schemes over prime order groups where messages are group elements. This includes ElGamal, Cramer-Shoup (CS), and also a slight variation of the separating scheme from Section 3.1, e.g., instantiated with Cramer-Shoup (see Section B). Note that the restrictions on the polynomials in Definition 3 are reasonable for meaningful encryption (see Section A). has been chosen randomly and
Definition 3. Let
is a collision resistant hash function computed over group elements with exponents of the form
IND-SO-CPA in the Generic Group Model
We base the formalization of the IND-SO-CPA game for generic adversaries on the generic group model (GGM) introduced by Shoup [23] . In Shoup's GGM elements are encoded as unique random bit strings, ensuring that no special property of a group's representation can be exploited. More precisely, let ⊂ {0, 1} log 2 (p) , where | | = p, denote the set of possible element encodings of a cyclic group G of order p. Since any such group G is isomorphic to ( , +), we will always use for the internal representation of G. A generic group oracle defines the random map between group elements and encodings and allows A to perform operations from Ω = {+, −} on encoded group elements. Equality testing can be done without the help of O since encodings are unique.
Internal State of O. The oracle maintains two lists L and E which are used to define the random mapping between and in a lazy manner: L ⊂ will be initially populated with the elements comprising the public key of the considered encryption scheme. While A interacts with O, additional elements are added to L. The list E ⊂ contains the random encodings corresponding to the elements in L. More precisely, the i-th encoding E i represents the i-th element L i . We will denote the encoding of an element a ∈ L by [[a] ].
Encoding of Elements. Each time an element a should be added to L, O checks if a is already contained in L. If this is the case, [[a]
] is already defined and will be appended to E again. Otherwise, a fresh encoding σ ← \ E is sampled and appended to E. The encoding [[a] ] is sent to A. We may assume that a generic algorithm A always outputs encodings it has previously received by the oracle: A fresh encoding not contained in E is associated with a random a ∈ \L. Assuming |L| is polynomial in log(p), such an element can be efficiently generated by A itself with overwhelming probability 1− |L| p by sampling a random a ∈ . The corresponding encoding [[a] ] can be computed from [ [1] ] using doubleand-add. Similarly, in our upcoming IND-SO-CPA setting, A will be able to output an encoding that has been computed by another generic algorithm, but has not explicitly given to A, only with negligible probability of at most Figure  3a . By abuse of notation we assume that for a new input [[a] ] given to a generic algorithm (in the sense that a ∈ L), a is first added to L and then an encoding is determined. The hash function H : G u4 → is modeled as a Random Oracle, which on input of u 4 concatenated encodings, outputs a fresh hash value z ← if it has not received this input before. Otherwise, the hash value which has been chosen previously is returned. Furthermore, as can be seen from Figure 3a , both the adversary A and samp are modeled as generic algorithms. The algorithm samp is stateless but its output may depend on the public key [[P (x)]] P ∈P since this was given as input to A before samp was created.
The GGM IND-SO-CPA Game. The IND-SO-CPA game for generic adversaries against an (P, E, H, H)-CS-type encryption scheme is shown in

Equivalence for (P, E, H, H)-CS-Type Encryption
As a warm-up, consider the IND-SO-CPA game for ElGamal, viewed as a CStype encryption scheme where P = (1, X) and E = (Y, XY +M ), in the GGM. In this model, it is not hard to show (by means of a simulation game) that the only source of information for the adversary about the challenge bit b are non-trivial equations between elements that are linear combinations of the secret key x, the unopened random coins for encryption (y j ) j ∈I , and the unopened encrypted messages (m 0,j ) j ∈I . More precisely, an adversary may only obtain information about b if the difference Δ (x, y 1 , . . . , y n , m 0,1 , . . . , m 0,n ) of two computed elements is zero, where Δ is a non-zero polynomial of the form
and β j = γ j = 0 for j ∈ I (I = ∅ if we are not yet in the opening phase). What is the probability that this happens? Note that in contrast to the secret key and the random coins, the messages m 0,j are not necessarily uniformly chosen. So the well-known Schwartz-Zippel Lemma cannot immediately be applied. However, since samp is also assumed to be generic, m 0,j will be of the form m 0,j = R j (x) for some polynomial R j of the form R j = α 0 + α 1 X. Let us consider the polynomial Δ = Δ(R 1 , . . . , R n ) which results from replacing any occurrence of M j by R j . It is easy to see that Δ = 0 if Δ = 0. Finally, we can apply Schwartz-Zippel to Δ to upper bound the probability that Δ(x, y 1 , . . . , y n , m 0,1 , . . . , m 0,n ) = Δ (x 1 , y 1 , . . . , y n ) is zero, yielding the bound More generally, we can show that any Δ and R j 's can be used to build an IND-CPA adversary that works similarly. This is done in the first part (Theorem 3) of our proof which is actually independent of the generic model. It essentially says that if for all possible public keys and all possible encryptions of certain messages, we can efficiently compute a non-trivial representation of 1 ∈ G in terms of the public key and the ciphertexts, then we can win the IND-CPA game with overwhelming probability. The idea is to replace one of the messages with a different one for which the equation does not hold anymore and use these two messages in the scope of the IND-CPA game. In the second part (Theorem 4), we show that any efficient generic adversary who wins the IND-SO-CPA game with non-negligible probability gives rise to such a representation (in form of a polynomial) and corresponding messages.
Theorem 3. Let a (P, E, H, H)-CS-type encryption scheme PKE over a group G of prime order p be given. Furthermore, let a polynomial Δ of the form
and polynomials R 1 , . . . , R n of the form R i = P ∈P α P P (X) over be given (where the coefficients α, β in the above representation are known) such that , y 1 , . . . , y i , z 1 , . . . , z i , it holds that Δ(x, y 1 , . . . , y i , z 1 , . . . , z i , m 1 , . . . , m i ) = 0, where
. Furthermore, if we additionally choose m i ∈ at random, the probability that Δ (x, y 1 , . . . , y i , z 1 , . . . , z i , m 1 Now, we are prepared to describe the IND-CPA adversary. First, B receives the public key (g P (x * ) ) P ∈P of the (P, E, H, H)-CS-type encryption scheme from the challenger. Using this key it creates the message g
αP , where R i = P ∈P α P P (X), and g
, where m * 1 ← . Then it sends them to the challenger who responds with the ciphertext 
where it is easy to see that B is in fact able to evaluate this polynomial in the exponent (cf. paragraph on runtime). If the resulting element equals 1, B outputs out B = 0 and otherwise 1. As we know from the previous analysis, the element in Equation 3 happens to be 1 for both messages with probability at most
. So in this case B's guess is correct with probability 1 2 . If this failure does not happen B's guess is correct with probability 1. In total, we have a probability of at least 3 , B uses the known representation in P and E. For the first part
αP about O(log(p)|P|) group operations are required. To compute the second at most n − 1 encryptions are needed. More precisely, the second part n j=1 E∈E g βj,E E(x,yj,zj,m j ) can be computed (for j = i) as a multiexponentiation (the exponents are the monomials of each E) with elements of the form a
where a = g
multiplications.
Theorem 4 says that from any generic IND-SO-CPA adversary A certain polynomials as required for Theorem 3 can be extracted using "white-box access" to A. Here the extraction algorithm B does not only play the role of the IND-SO-CPA challenger and restricts itself to considering the in-and output of A (in this case we would be in the standard model) but closely observes the operations A performs on its inputs, i.e., B substitutes (and modifies) the generic oracle. More precisely, B's strategy is as follows: It turns the real IND-SO-CPA game in the generic model into a simulation game which does not reveal any information about the secret bit b chosen by the challenger. So A has no better chance than mere guessing to win the simulation game. Since the simulation game and the real game are equivalent unless a certain failure event occurs, an adversary who has a non-negligible advantage in winning the real game must cause this simulation failure with non-negligible probability. The crucial point is that a failure event is defined in a way such that it gives rise to the polynomials from Theorem 3. 
Proof. Game 1 is the real IND-SO-CPA game as shown in Figure 3a . Game 2 is the transition game shown in Figure 3b , which is actually equivalent to the real IND-SO-CPA game. Here, we define a new oracle O 1 as follows: O 1 uses polynomials to internally represent elements from . More precisely, we have L ⊂ [X, Y 1 , . . . , Y n , Z, M] . Initially, the list is populated with the polynomials P describing the public key. Later, for each message, polynomials E describing its ciphertext are added. Applying the group operation in this polynomial representation translates to polynomial addition over . Moreover, the oracle receives certain elements x, y 1 , . . . , y n , z, m 0 which are used to evaluate 
Note that a message m 0,j , 1 ≤ j ≤ n, might be a non-constant polynomial of the form P ∈P α P P (X) in which case we assume that it is also evaluated with x. Now, each time a polynomial R 1 is added to L, the list is searched for a polynomial R 2 satisfying Equation 4. If such an element is found, the corresponding encoding is returned, otherwise a fresh, unused encoding is sampled. There is only a minor technical difference between the two oracles: O 0 immediately evaluates polynomials and calculates with -elements, whereas O 1 does the calculation with polynomials and delays the evaluation to the point when encodings are determined. However, this is equivalent and so A has the same success probability in the real and the transition game.
Game 3 is the simulation game, as shown in Figure 3c , in which the computation is independent of the bit b. More precisely, we make the computation independent of all (unopened) secrets and messages. Thus, A has no better chance than guessing b. The simulation game is equivalent to the transition game unless a simulation failure occurs yielding polynomials which can be used to build an IND-CPA adversary.
For the simulation game, we slightly modify O 1 resulting in a oracle O 2 : -During Initialization & Challenge, O 2 assigns two elements R 1 , R 2 ∈ L the same encoding if they are equal as polynomials over , i.e., (R 1 − R 2 ) ≡ 0. -In the Opening Phase the oracle receives the choices {y i , z i , m 0,i } i∈I revealed to A and assigns the same encoding if (
The reason why we need to simulate differently in the Opening Phase is that the adversary obtains additional information about part of the secrets. For instance, he now can compute the encryption of m 0,i , for i ∈ I, on his own. So we need to make sure that he receives the same encodings for the ciphertext that the oracle has assigned in the previous phase. Let us now assume that bad 1 happens for some Δ := R 1 − R 2 and m 0,1 , . . . , m 0,n as well as x, y 1 , . . . , y n , z chosen uniformly at random by B. 4 Note that since generic algorithms are only able to add polynomials whose encodings they receive as input, Δ is of the form
and m 0,1 , . . . , m 0,n are of the form m 0,i = P ∈P α P P (X). The degree of Δ is upper bounded by d = max S∈P∪E (deg(S)) and the degree of m 0,i is upper bounded by d = max S∈P (deg(S)).
In case bad 2 occurs, we consider the partially evaluated polynomial Δ := ((R 1 −R 2 )((m 0,i ) i∈I ))((z i , y i ) i∈I ) and the polynomials m 0,1 , . . . , m 0,n as before. Due to the form of the monomials of E, evaluation of E with m 0,i , z i , and y i results in polynomials of the form P ∈P α P P (X). Hence, also Δ can be viewed as a polynomial of the form in Equation 7 , where the β i,E coefficients are zero for i ∈ I. The upper bounds d and d specified above also hold in this case.
To summarize, with probability at least Pr[bad 1 ∨ bad 2 ], B can extract a nonzero polynomial Δ as in Equation 7 and polynomials m 0,1 , . . . , m 0,n . Δ becomes zero when evaluated with m 0,1 , . . . , m 0,n and uniformly and independently chosen values x, y j , z j , where j ∈ {1, . . . , n} for the case bad 1 and j ∈ I for the case bad 2 . Applying Lemma 2 stated below yields that Δ already becomes zero when evaluated with the messages with probability at least Pr[bad 1 ∨ bad 2 ] − dd p . In this case B has found polynomials as required in Theorem 3.
Proof.
The last inequality follows from the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma.
Let us briefly estimate the runtime of B. The algorithm runs A once, samp twice, plays the role of the IND-SO-CPA challenger, the generic oracle O 2 , and checks for a simulation failure. We will count the number of operations on polynomials and group elements: B maintains the list L of polynomials on behalf of O 2 . This requires at most O(t + t ) additions of polynomials. Additionally, to determine encodings, B needs to compute at most O(|L| 2 ) = O((t+t +|P|+|E|n) 2 ) difference polynomials Δ. Note that the monomials of all these polynomials come from a set of at most at most r(|P| + |E|n) different monomials. Thus, one polynomial addition results in at most r(|P| + |E|n) operations over .
To check for simulation failures, B needs to evaluate the difference polynomials Δ. To do so, B maintains a second list L ⊂ just like the real O 0 would do and computes the corresponding differences. Evaluating P and E when added to Note that the success probability of the IND-CPA adversary B from Theorem 3 is non-negligible if the degrees of the public key and encryption polynomials of PKE are small, i.e., polynomial in log(p). Moreover, B is efficient if the representation of these polynomials is polynomial in log(p) (always the case for an efficient encryption scheme) as well as the number n of involved message polynomials R i . The same statement holds for the polynomial extraction algorithm from Theorem 4, where we additionally need to assume that the runtime of the IND-SO-CPA adversary is polynomial and its advantage is non-negligible.
A Some Remarks on Definition 3
We would like to note that the restrictions on the form and degrees of polynomials made in Definition 3 are not of artificial nature and just derived from the proofs but need to be satisfied by a meaningful encryption scheme. On the other hand, we would like to stress that they are not sufficient for such a scheme as, e.g., no conditions on the nature of the decryption algorithm are made.
In particular, the encryption polynomials E may not be "arbitrary" polynomials in X since during encryption we are usually only given P (x) and do not know how to evaluate encryption polynomials not being "combinations" of public key polynomials. Furthermore, any public key polynomial may only appear linearly in any encryption polynomial. Otherwise, in absence of a pairing we do not know how to compute, e.g., P 2 efficiently. In fact, in the case of a single group this translates to solving the Square-DH problem. For this reason, also any monomial of an encryption polynomial might only contain at most one public key polynomial. Moreover, assume an encryption polynomial E would include a monomial of the form αP e1
with e 1 + e 3 > 1. This would mean that we have to solve a variant of the DH problem to encrypt a message unless we know the DL of the message.
Finally, the condition on the input of the hash function ensures that the input is not constant for different m . The use of a hash function for constant input would be meaningless. Note that for an encryption scheme without hash function like ElGamal e 2 is simply set to zero in all encryption polynomials.
B A Separating CS-type Encryption Scheme
Interestingly, we again obtain a CS-type scheme if we instantiate (a slight variation of) the separating scheme from Section 3.1 with a CS-type scheme according to Definition 3. Some details can be found in the following.
-Compared to the original definition of the separating scheme, the message space of a CS-type scheme is a group G of order p and not . But as already mentioned, this is no real issue. What we can do in our particular case here is the following: We only need a means such as the degree-≤ k polynomial F before that allows to generate and reconstruct the data points (i, m i ) i∈ [3k] , where m i = g m i ∈ G. This can easily be done "using F in the exponent". -The secret key of the CS-type scheme needs to be extended by a key K for the PRF. Note that this is not forbidden by Definition 3. Moreover, due to our slight modification above, we do not need an additional prime p in the public key of the CS-type scheme. -In order to mark a ciphertext as regular, Enc simply adds a fixed group element to each regular CS-type ciphertext. For instance, this could translate to adding polynomials P 6 = 0 and E 5 = P 6 to the specification of CramerShoup as CS-type encryption scheme shown in Section 4.1. The other types of inputs we allow to Dec can be marked similarly using other fixed elements. -Note that apart from these markers, we do not need to care about how the decryption function looks like since Definition 3 only specifies the form of public keys and (regular) ciphertexts.
C Our CCA-Separation Works in the GGM
In this section, we briefly argue why our CCA-separation also holds in the GGM, i.e., there exists a IND-CCA secure generic group encryption scheme that can be efficiently broken by a generic group IND-SO-CCA adversary. First, it is easy to see that our separating scheme works over any (prime order) group G when it is instantiated with a generic group encryption scheme like Cramer-Shoup: The original IND-CCA secure scheme (CS in our case) is treated as a black box and also the modifications applied work for any group. In particular, in Section B we show how the message space can be switched to G and how SOA(sk , Z) can be implemented in this case. It is clear, that the resulting separating scheme is IND-CCA secure despite this switch of the message space. To summarize, it perfectly makes sense and is meaningful to consider the IND-SO-CCA game for our separating scheme in the GGM.
Second, the IND-SO-CCA adversary A and its sampling algorithm only apply generic group operations: The message distribution A outputs will be D = (g F (1) , . . . , g F (3k) ) F ∈ [X] uniformly chosen degree-≤ k polynomial , where g = G, and can be implemented by a generic group algorithm. Moreover, the polynomial interpolation A's resampling algorithm uses can be realized over generic groups as shown in Section B. As also shown there, the interpolation
